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Mind, Meaning, & Knowledge: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, edited 
by Annalisa Coliva. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. viii + 494. H/b £62.00. 
 
This volume is the first of two planned volumes centred on and celebrating Crispin 
Wright's contributions to philosophy. The book has five parts; four feature largely 
original essays engaging with central themes and topics in Wright's work and the fifth is 
a substantial set of replies by Wright. As the title suggests, this volume is dedicated to 
issues concerning mind, meaning and knowledge, with the second volume to focus on 
philosophy of logic, language and mathematics. But it is a sign of Wright's range and 
comprehensiveness that the divisions are not nearly so neat. 
  This short review will give a very brief overview of the critical essays the volume 
collects, then offer some general remarks on the collection and on whom it might 
interest and why, and finally indicate its particular strengths. 
  The first section of the book focuses on rule-following and the normativity of 
meaning, a topic Wright first examined in connection with the philosophy of 
mathematics, dropped for a while, and then returned to. Paul Boghossian challenges 
Wright's initial view on which appealing to intention can make sense of rule following, 
and argues the problem is deeper and more intractable than Wright’s optimism makes it 
appear. Christopher Peacocke offers a positive account of rule-following, highlighting 
points of difference between his approach to the problem and Wright’s. Paul Horwich 
focuses on implicit rule-following, which he takes to be central, and argues that law-like 
regularities of word use ultimately ground which rules of use we’re following. He also 
elaborates on how he thinks these facts underpin meaning, truth-conditions and 
epistemic norms. In the final essay of this section, Akeel Bilgrami accepts that 
Wittgenstein taught us that intentions, in general, are normative, but argues against the 
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widespread view that meaning intentions are normative because intentions in general 
are; to put this point another way, when it comes to meanings, intending a meaning and 
living up to that intention are not as different as everyone supposes. 
  The second section of the book turns to the problem of self-knowledge, of making 
sense of how we can know our own mental states, when we do, in a distinctively 
immediate and authoritative way. This is a stand-alone problem in philosophy of mind 
and epistemology, but it also follows naturally as a concern for Wright given his 
intention-based answer to the rule-following sceptic. As Wright puts it in his reply to 
Horwich, if one thinks an appeal to “intuitively immediate self-knowledge...of our own 
intentions” can dispatch the sceptic, then “the real issue raised...is to understand better 
the nature of immediate (or recollected) intentional self-knowledge and how it is 
feasible.” (394-395) Wright’s own answer to this challenge is a constitutivist account on 
which avowals don't report pre-existing mental states, which they either get right or fail 
to get right; they rather, very roughly speaking, constitute one’s being in the state in 
question. This section has just two critical essays, one by Barry Smith and one by Dorit 
Bar-On. Smith focuses on whether Wright’s account can make sense of a person’s 
knowledge of what she means in light of the apparent fact that meaning is at least often 
public. A person can’t, it seems, have immediate and authoritative knowledge of what 
she means if what she means is determined by how words are used in public space. Bar-
On also raises challenges for Wright’s constitutivist account, and then proposes in its 
place a neo-expressivist picture on which avowals are expressive acts that are 
nonetheless truth-evaluable. This picture, she thinks, explains the distinct epistemic 
dimension of avowals by pointing to the fact avowals are fundamentally expressive, but 
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without adopting a full blown anti-realist expressivism that Wright and many others 
(rightly in her view) reject. 
  The third section, with contributions by Simon Blackburn, Stewart Shapiro, and 
Carol Rovane, focuses on Wright’s influential contribution to the debate between 
realists and anti-realists. Blackburn’s essay focuses on the deflationism of Hartry Field 
and of Paul Horwich, and explores what Blackburn takes to be an uneasy relationship 
between minimalism about truth and expressivism as a theory of normativity. Shapiro 
raises two critical challenges to Wright’s appeal, in Truth and Objectivity, to the notions 
of width of cosmological role and cognitive command, which Wright had thought can 
distinguish the objective from the non-objective. Rovane’s essay develops an alternative 
to Wright’s picture of the relation between irresolvable disagreement and relativism, 
one that construes relativism as committed to the idea that some truths are logically 
isolated from one another and hence “cannot be embraced together”. 
  The fourth section focuses on warrant, transmission failure, closure and 
skepticism, with essays by Jim Pryor, José Zalabardo, Annalisa Coliva and Michael 
Williams. Pryor and Zalabardo engage principally with Wright’s influential discussion 
of warrant and transmission failure. Pryor argues that Moorean reasoning does not 
suffer from the only credible form of transmission-failure on offer, while Zalabardo 
raises doubts about whether there’s a principled way to limit the transmission of warrant 
in problematic cases; there’s a better way, he thinks, to make sense of what is wrong 
with Moorean arguments. In their contributions, Annalisa Coliva and Michael Williams 
shift focus slightly to engage with Wright more squarely on scepticism. Coliva develops 
a middle position between Wright and Pryor according to which the right notion of 
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epistemic rationality is one that is partly constituted by acceptance of such claims as 
that there is an external world. Although we might have to assume there is an external 
world in order for our visual experience to give us warrant for the first premise of 
Moore’s proof, that here is a hand, this doesn’t mean that we need to have independent 
warrant for this assumption. In his essay, Williams argues that Wright’s response to the 
sceptic is much more complex than it first appears to be and gives too much away to the 
sceptic. 
  With a celebratory volume such as this it is easy for the work as a whole to lack 
focus. Such collections are not intended as works of intellectual biography, even in a 
thin sense, although in the present case most contributors include the warm 
introductions and conversational asides we expect in a festschrift, and Wright’s own 
substantial replies (four essays, which run to more than 100 pages) have just the right 
amount of autobiographical reflection. Nor however is a festschrift typically focused on 
some particular topic, as most anthologies are. Their unity is instead pinned down, 
narrowly, by the fact the issued discussed are all issues that some particular person was 
interested in and explored. This is not a complaint, either in the general case or with 
Coliva’s collection. What better way to celebrate someone than to focus on their 
interests, engage with them on those interests, and make space for them to say 
something both substantive and personal in reply? It does however bear on whom the 
book is for and how it will be used. The present volume should be cherished by students 
and friends of Wright, and together with the second, forthcoming volume, should be of 
considerable value to anyone who wants to engage with Wright’s philosophy as a 
whole, find connections between his approaches to this or that topic, and trace the arc of 
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his thinking over the decades. Beyond this, the book, or rather each of its parts, will be 
an excellent resource for people working on any of the specific issues discussed within 
it.  E.g., anyone with a serious interest in scepticism and Moore-style arguments should 
benefit from Section IV, on warrant transmission, closure, transmission failure and 
scepticism, and from Wright’s replies. They are less likely to devote time and energy to 
the 125 pages on rule-following and the normativity of meaning, but so be it. 
  There is no space in this short review to say anything substantive about the 13 
individual essays that make up the critical part of the book. They are all well-done, and 
written in a way that should engage those new to the issues while also offering 
something to experts. I will instead draw attention to three specific strengths of the 
book. First, Coliva’s introductory essay is excellent, with apt and informative 
summaries of each critical essay. The essay also gives a sense of the arc of Wright’s 
thinking on each topic over his career, as it highlights main themes, theses and 
publications. This is not done in so much detail that it will numb those who know 
Wright’s work well, but there is enough there to give helpful orientation to students or 
philosophers who pick up the volume with the hope of thereby gaining an introduction 
of sorts to Wright’s contributions to philosophy. Second, as befits this sort of volume, 
there is a comprehensive and well-organised bibliography of Wright’s publications and 
an excellent index (the entry for ‘Warrant’, for instance, subdivides into Acquisition of, 
Closure, Doxastic, Epistemic, Empirical, Evidential, First-time, First-level, Non-
evidential, Pragmatic, Propositional, Second-level, Transmission, Testimonial, and 
Unearned). Given that the book treats of diverse topics, and so may well be read in bits 
and pieces by people interested in this or that topic, this is a very helpful addition. 
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Finally and most importantly, a great strength of the volume is Wright’s extensive 
replies, which are rich with context, insight and argument. Wright engages with the 
content of each of the critical essays in the course of a sprawling and conversational 
discussion of the general problematic explored in each section. The effect is powerful, 
and the reader gains a better sense not merely of Wright’s thinking on the issue in 
question, now and over time, but of the whole shape of the problem. Wright’s replies 
also do much to give unity and coherence to each section of critical essays, as in treating 
each set of essays as a whole he draws attention to points of similarity and difference 
among his critics, contrasts positions where appropriate, highlights animating 
assumptions and convictions, and so on. This volume is a fitting tribute and testament to 
the value of Wright’s work over nearly five decades. 
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